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IRWIN HARRY IWTH, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR, 
Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Evidence of past mis-
conduct of a disbarred attorney is admissible in a proceeding 
for his reinstatement. 
[2] !d.-Reinstatement-Burden of Proof.-A disbarred attorney 
seeking reinstatement has the burden of proving rehabilita-
tion by evidence of his present qualifications. 
[3] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Proof of present honesty and 
integrity of disbarred attorney, applying for reinstatement, 
must be sufficient to overcome the court's former adverse 
judgment of his character. 
[4] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-In determining whether a dis-
barred attorney seeking reinstatement has met the burden of 
proving rehabilitation, the evidence of present character must 
be considered in the light of the moral shortcomings which 
resulted in the imposition of discipline. 
[5] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-In proceeding for reinstate-
ment of a disbarred attorney, the question is not whether 
any evidence was presented to controvert his showing of 
present good character, but whether his proof of reform is 
convincing and overwhelming. 
[6] Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-The rehabilitation required to 
reinstate an attorney disbarred because of his conviction on 
a grand theft charge is not shown by evidence which merely 
tends to prove a present good reputation for honesty and 
integrity in business dealings, where his own testimony indi-
cates a more than careless attitude toward the rules of con-
duct of the profession, where in discussing his financial af-
fairs he consistently failed or refused to differentiate be-
tween capital and income, where he stated that his statement 
of earnings in the petition complies with a rule of The State 
Bar requiring a report of monthly earning·s and other income, 
despite the fact that he presented no such statement, and 
where he had misinformed one of his witnesses concerning 
the reason for his disbarment and had informed none of 
them of preceding transactions for which he had been in-
vestigated or disciplined. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 48; Am.Jur., Attorneys 
at Law, § 301. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-7] Attorneys, § 184; [8] Attorneys, 
§ 187. 
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17] Id.-Reinstatement--Evidence.-Letters of recommendation 
and favorable testimony of witnesses are entitled to consider-
able weight in a procePding for reinstatement of a disbarred 
attorney, but such evidence, however laudatory or great in 
quantity, is not alone conclusive. 
[8] !d.-Reinstatement--Review of Board's Action.-Although the 
Supreme Court has plenary power to reinstate a disbarred 
attorney, it will accord the greatest deference to the recom-
mendation of The State Bar and its administrative commit-
tee, and only where the record clearly demonstrates that the 
applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of the duties 
and responsibilities of an attorney at law in relation to his 
clients and the courts, may a decision overruling the un-
favorable action of the Board of Governors be justified. 
APPLICATION for reinstatement of disbarred attorney. 
Application denied. 
John W. Preston for Petitioner. 
Neil G. Locke and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
'fHE COURT.-Irwin Harry Roth was disbarred in 1942 
upon conviction of a felony. (Bar Misc. No. 1745.) In 1950, 
he petitioned for reinstatement. An administrative committee 
of The State Bar unanimously recommended that his petition 
for reinstatement be denied. The matter is before this court 
upon Roth's petition to review the order of the Board of 
Governors upholding that determination. (Rules on Original 
Proceedings in Reviewing Courts, rule 59 [b].) 
Roth first was admitted to practice in Missouri. In 1931, 
following three years of practice in Missouri, he was admitted 
to the California bar without examination. 
About three years later, Roth was adjudged in contempt 
of court for alleged volations of court orders restricting the 
withdrawal and use of funds recovered as damages by minors 
in personal injury actions in which they had been represented 
by him. Because of the insufficiency of the affidavits by which 
the contempt proceedings were instituted, he was released upon 
a writ of habeas corpus. (In re Roth, 3 Cal.App.2d 226 [39 
P.2d 490] .) In a concurring opinion, one justice suggested 
that "the facts show a scandalous manipulation of funds 
awarded by the court for the benefit of minors. Whether or 
not petitioner was involved in such manipulation, I do not 
intimate. It would seem, however, that the facts would admit 
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of positive allegations should The State Bar be advised to 
take further action." ( P. 237.) 
Acting upon this suggestion, The State Bar instituted 
disciplinary proceedings against Roth, charging him with 
violation of court orders and misappropriation of funds of 
elients. (L. A. No. 798.) Upon the recommendation of its 
administrative committee, the Board of Governors dismissed 
the proceeding for insufficiency of the evidence to support 
the charges. · 
In 1937, Roth was suspended from practice for a period of 
six months by order of this court for violations of the J{nles 
of Professional Conduct by the solicitation of employment. 
(Roth v. State Bar, 8 Cal.2d 656 [67 P.2d 337].) In that pro-
ceeding, only two specific cases were under investigation. 
However, the court said: "The further fact should be men-
tioned that petitioner's conduct in other cases has been the 
subject of investigation and that he has been employed in 
other cases under suspicious circumstances. 
'' \Ve entertain no doubt that petitioner has been soliciting 
the employment of himself through persons wlro are not en-
titled to practice law and has been paying those persons for 
this solicitation, and, from all the circumstances, we are con-
vinced that his conduct has extended over a considerable 
period of time .... " (P. 659.) 
When Roth was retained in 1941 to defend Thayne Staker, 
$1,000 was deposited with him to be used as bail. Roth put 
up $500 as security for bail and retained the balance. As a 
result of this transaction, Roth was charged with grand theft 
and found guilty. He repaid the $1,000, sentence was sus-
pende'd and he was placed on probation for 10 years. 
'While this proceeding was pending, the Board of Governors 
declined to accept Roth's proffered resignation without prej-
udice. Roth did not appeal from the judgment of conviction 
;uHl he was disbarred automatically. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 6102.) Five years later, probation was terminated, the .iudg-
Jnt>nt set aside, and the cause dismissed under the provisions 
of section 1203.4 of the Penal Code. 
After disbarment, Roth volunteered for military service 
but was rejected because of his age. He became a defense 
worker in a shipyard, studied accounting at night school, 
and secured a position in the accounting department of an 
aircraft company. 
Soon afterward, he went into the liquor business for him-
self. He sold that business about seven months later to pur-
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chase the first of a series of three bars which he operated 
during the remainder of his period of probation. Two of 
these bars were on South Main Street in the ''skid row'' 
section of l.JOS Angeles. The third was a de luxe restaurant-
night club known as the "Californian" of which he was part 
owner and operator from 1946 to 1949. For a short time, Roth 
also engaged in an unprofitable building venture. After he 
sold his interest in the "Californian," Roth sought employ-
ment in the aircraft industry but, because of his age, was 
unable to find work. 
In connection with his various liquor businesses, Roth ob-
tained the requisite licenses after the usual investigation of 
his character and reputation. No license was revoked, nor 
was Roth at any time in difficulty with the authorities con-
cerning the manner in which he conducted his premises. His 
purchases of the various businesses were financed by sub-
stantial loans, one in excess of $70,000. Although, to a cer-
tain extent secured by the assets of the business including 
the fixtures, it appears that the larger portion of these loans 
was based upon personal credit. All such loans were repaid 
in full, and Roth is not presently in debt. 
In his petition for reinstatement, Roth stated his earnings 
in lump sum figures ranging from about $1,300 in 1943 to 
$5,200 in 1949, with a loss of approximately $1,600 in 1946. 
No breakdown indicating the sources of his earnings was 
given. He also presented copies of his federal income tax re-
tnrns for the years 1947 to 1949. These show a declared income 
of $2,100 in 1948 and $4,475 in 1949, rather than the $5,200 
reported for each of those years in his petition for reinstate-
ment. At the hearing before the administrative committee, 
Roth testified that he ''earned over $1,000.00 a month'' in 
1946. but that he had to sell one of his bars at a $13,000 loss. 
He also stated that, in 1944, he had lost about $7,000 in stock 
transactions. Apparently he deducted this Joss in arriving at a 
"net income" figure for that year of approximately $1,800. 
At the hearings before the local administrative committee, 
Roth produced 11 witnesses who testified that his moral char-
acter and legal ability are good. He also presented eight 
letters in which the writers expressed confidencein him. The 
uncontradicted evidence shows that, since his disbarment. Roth 
has not been in any leg·al difficulties and has been fair and 
honest in his dealings with others. 
'rwo officers of the vice squad of the Los Angeles Police 
Department testified that Roth made every effort to conduct 
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his bar business in a lawful manner. According to them, his 
places were considered above average for the neighborhood in 
which they were located. This opinion of Roth's business deal-
ings was repeated by the probation officer who recommended 
termination of his probation. 
Five of the witnesses knew Roth only casually and based 
their opinions of him either upon what he had told them 
himself or upon information supplied by others. None of 
them had beeu told of Hoth 's diseipline prior to his disbar-
ment. lloth had misinformed one of them coneerning the 
facts of his conviction. 'rhis witness said that Hoth 's in-
accuracy in stating the reason for his disbarment "is inclined 
to lessen my faith in him slightly.'' Although he had heard 
nothing against Hoth, the witness said, ''vVhether he is re-
formefl eompletely or not, I do not know." Two of the others 
stated that if they had kno1vn of Roth's prior difficultic•s their 
opinion of him might have been different. 
One witness, the judge who granted Roth probation after 
his conviction, knew nothing concerning him since that time. 
He stated that Roth had showed above average ability as 
a practitioner before his court prior to his disbarment. Two 
more of the witnesses who testified that Roth was capable 
as an attorney based their opinion upon the ability which 
he demonstrated in practice before being disbarred. Three 
stated that he displayed a present understanding of legal 
problems. 
Only two of the witnesses had more than a casual acquaint-
ance with Roth. One was his brother, the other a former 
law associate. Basing their opinions upon the manner in 
which Roth conducted his business operations, both felt that 
he had rehabilitated himself. Recently, Roth has used his 
former associate's law library for study. 
Seven of the letters introduced into evidence were to the 
effect that Roth has a reputation for honesty and integrity in 
his business dealings. The eighth was written by the judge 
who terminated his probation. Until the motion for dis-
missal came before him, he knew nothing of Roth's difficul-
ties. In prior professional dealings with Roth, the judge 
had been impressed with him "as being an honorable man." 
The judge wrote, "I have every reason to believe that Mr. 
Roth is worthy of the confidence of the community and 
that it would be a credit to the Bar to reinstate him." 
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No evidence was introduced to indicate that Roth has been 
guilty of any wrongdoing since disbarment. The chief in-
vestigator for The State Bar testified that no complaints have 
been made against Roth since his conviction. 
Concerning one of the matters involved in the contempt 
proceeding and the first disciplinary investigation (In re 
Roth, supra; L. A. No. 798, supra), Roth testified that the 
court directed money recovered for a minor to be placed 
in the bank and not withdrawn until the boy reached his 
majority. However, he said, "about six months later or so 
the boy wanted to buy an automobile, and the parents wanted 
him to have it and after that they withdrew sufficient money 
to buy the car. That, in my opinion, was not a violation 
of the court order." 
He discussed the matters which led to his suspension (Roth 
v. State Bar, supra) as follows: "When I came out here, 
there were open and legal ambulance chasing businesses going 
on . . . I would pay them a fiat fee for this investigation 
work . . . it was a better deal than some lawyers that were 
splitting a fee with them . . . I had only been out here for 
a few years. And then I learned that the Bar Association 
prohibited the handling of any case that was originally solic-
ited regardless of what agreement the lawyer may have had 
with the person who solicited it, and I quit handling any 
cases that were originally solicited at least two years before 
I was called into the Bar for handling and soliciting cases.'' 
Roth stated to the committee that he had no right to take 
the money in the case which resulted in his conviction and 
disbarment. He said that he needed it because of illness in 
the family and thought he would be able to repay it from 
the fee which he expected to receive upon completion of the 
trial. The fee was not paid to him and he could not return 
the money when it was demanded of him. 
In regard to his present legal ability, Roth testified: "I 
read all of the advance sheets decisions, I have read the codes, 
I have read all the textbooks and pamphlets that he (Burby) 
has for law students who are about to take the Bar exam-
ination, and I have discussed legal cases and legal problems 
with lawyers that I know who keep abreast of it.'' He also 
stated that he has attended refresher courses on procedure 
and law lectures, as well as meetings of The State Bar. 
The local administrative committee concluded that this 
evidence was not sufficient to support the burden of proving 
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rehabilitation and present learning in the law and that Roth 
lacks the present qualifications for reinstatement. Its unani-
mous recommendation that the petition be denied was ap-
proved by the Board of Governors. 
Roth contends that evidence of his past misconduct is ir-
relevant and does not constitute a ground for denying rein-
statement. According to him, the relevant evidence shows 
without dispute that he has both the moral and mental qual-
ifications to practice law. The State Bar argues that Roth 'R 
prior misconduct was properly considered. The position of 
the Board of Governors is that he failed to meet the burden 
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is en-
titled to reinstatement. 
[1] There is no merit to Roth's contention that evidence 
of his past misconduct is inadmissible in this proceeding. 
'rhe cases upon which he relies for this argument are those 
which lay down the rule that the petitioner for reinstatement 
may not attack the proceedings which resulted in his dis-
barment. (Maggart v. State Bar, 29 Cal.2d 439, 443 [175 
P.2d 505]; In re Andreani, 14 Cal.2d 736, 751 r97 P.2d 456]; 
Vaughan v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 740, 742 [284 P. 909].) 
[2] He has the burden of proving rehabilitation by evidence 
of his present qualifications. (Maggart v. State Bar, supra.) 
[3] This court repeatedly has held that "the person seek-
ing reinstatement, after disbarment, should be required to 
present stronger proof of his present honesty and integrity 
than one seeking admission for the first time whose character 
has never been in question. In other words, in an applica-
tion for reinstatement, although treated by the. court as a 
proceeding for admission, the proof presented must be suffi-
cient to overcome the court's former adverse judgment of 
applicant's character." (Kepler v. State Bar, 216 Cal. 52, 
!iii f 13 P.2d 500 l ; P'rinste1'n v. State Bar, 30 <::al.2d 541, 
!i46 [248 P.2d 3] ; Beeks v. State Ba1·, 35 Cal.2d 268, 27S 
[217 P.2d 409]; Maggart v. State Bar, supra, p. 444; MeAr-
tlmr v. State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 779, 788 [172 P.2d 55].) [ 4] In 
determining whether that burden has been met, the evidence 
of present character must be considered in the light of the 
moral shortcomings which resulted in the imposition of dis-
<'ipline. (Feinstein v. State Bar, S1tpra, pp. 560-561 and 
(•ases there cited.) 
[5] Roth argues that hE' is entitled to reinstatement be-
cause the evidence which he produced of his present good 
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moral character was undisputed. However, the question is 
not whether any evidence was presented to controvert his 
showing of present good character, but rather whether his 
proof is ''clear and convincing, nay, ... overwhelming, 
proof of reform." (In Te MorgansteTn, 85 Cal.App. 113, 117 
[259 P. 90] ; Feinstein v. State BaT, sttpm, p. 561; W ettlin 
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 862, 869 [151 P.2d 255] .) 
[6] The very most which can be said for the evidence 
produced by Roth is that it tends to prove a present good 
reputation for honesty and integrity in business dealings. 
There is no convincing or overwhelming proof that he now 
possesses the highest moral qualities required of an attorney. 
To the contrary, his own testimony indicates a more than 
careless attitude toward the rules of conduct of the pro-
fession. 
In discussing his financial affairs, Roth consistently failed 
or refused to differentiate between capital and income. In 
view of the fact that he testified to his qualification as an 
accountant, it cannot be inferred that his confusion of finances 
resulted from ignorance. He stated that his statement of 
earnings in the petition complies with a rule of The State 
Bar requiring a report of monthly earnings and other in-
come, together with the sources thereof. This was despite 
the fact that he had presented no statement of monthly 
earnings and other income and had reduced his report of 
annual income by capital losses. The failure to report a 
monthly income in excess of $1,000, earned within five years 
after his conviction for taking $500 of trust funds for his 
own use, does not tend to prove that Roth possesses the 
highest integrity. 
The same indifferent attitude toward strict compliance 
with the law is indicated in Roth's discussion of the contempt 
proceeding. (In re Roth, supm; h A. No. 798, supm.) In 
that instance, he did not consider the withdrawal of money 
to purchase an automobile to be a violation of a conrt order 
requiring the fund to be held intact. In like manner, Roth 'R 
testimony indicates that he feels aggrieved by the action of 
The State Bar in prosecuting him for ''ambulance chasing'' 
when it was being done openly. That he should have been 
familiar with the professional rules of ethics does not seem 
to have occurred to him. 
The testimony of the witnesses whom Roth produced is 
far from the clear and convincing ''proof which we could 
with confidence lay before the world in justification of a 
Prb. 19G:3] Ro'rH v. STA'l'E BAR 
[40 C.2d 307; 253 P.2d 9691 
315 
jndgment agaiu installing him in the profession." (In n; 
JVIorganstm·n. supra.) Mo,;t of them were mel'e c~asual ac-
quaintances. One, in faet, knew nothing about his present 
character. l~oth had misinformed one of the witnesses con-
cerning the reason for his disbarment and had informed none 
of them of the preceding series of transactions for which he 
had been investigated or disciplined. Several of the wit-
nesses indicated that such knowledge might have altered tJ1eir 
opinion of him. 
Roth relies upon J onesi v. State Bar, 29 Cal.2d 181 l178 
P.2d 793], as being similar in facts to the present situation 
and controlling upon the question of whether he should be 
readmitted. However, in the J onesi case the local adminis-
trative committee unanimously recommended the petitioner's 
readmission and the recommendation was approved by a 
representative of the local bar association. The Board of 
Governors, by a vote of nine to three, found that ,Jonesi was 
not entitled to reinstatement. It appeared from the record, 
however, that at least three of the members of the board were 
influenced by a belief that J onesi was precluded from rein-
statement because he had resigned in accordance with an order 
terminating his right to apply for readmission. In addition, 
J onesi produced recommendations by ''members of the bar 
who had frequent and fairly intimate contact with him." 
Under those circumstances, the court held that he was en-
titled to reinstatement. 
[7] J_,etters of recommendation and the favorable testi-
mony of witnesses are entitled to considerable weight, but 
such evidence, however laudatory or great in quantity, is not 
alone conclusive. (Feinstein v. State Bar, supra, p. 561.) 
The committee of 'l'he State Bar, which has an opportunity 
to hear the witnesses and the petitioner, is in a better posi-
tion than is this court, which has only the printed record 
upon which to determine the issue of the applicant's rehabili-
tation. [8] Although this court has plenary power to re-
instate· an applicant, it has always accorded the greatest defer-
ence to the recommendation of The State Bar and its admin-
istrative committee. (In re Lacey, 11 Cal.2d 699, 701 [81 
P .2d 935].) "Only where the record clearly and convincingly 
demonstrates that the applicant possesses an acceptable ap-
preciation of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at 
law in relation to his clients and the courts may a decision 
overruling the unfavorable action of the Board of Governors 
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lw justified." (Pm:nstm:n v. 8tnte Bnr, supra, p. S62; Beeks 
\·. 8tatc Bar, supra., p. 277.) 
1'he applieation of petitioner for reinstatement is denied. 
CARTEH, J.-I dissent. 
''The uncontradicted evidence shows that, since his disbar-
nu:'nt, Roth has not been in any legal difficulties and has been 
fair and honest in his dealings with others." "No evidence 
was iutroduced to indicate that Roth has been guilty of any 
wrongdoing since disbarment. The chief investigator for The 
State Bar testified that no complaints have been made against 
noth since his conviction.'' These statements from the majority 
opinion show that only evidence of misconduct prior to dis-
barment bars petitioner's right to reinstatement. 
The above quoted statements also show that a majority of 
this court has again considered conduct prior to disbarment 
in determining ·whether petitioner is presently rehabilitated so 
as to gain readmission to the Bar. It is also said that the evi-
dence he must produce as to his present good moral character 
must be ''clear and convincing, nay, ... overwhelming, proof 
of reform.'' I am still at a loss (see my dissent in Feinstein 
v. State Bar, 39 Cal.2d 541, 548 [248 P.2d 3]) to know just 
what is expected of a petitioner in a case such as this in way 
of the proof he must adduce. If he produced all the people 
with whom he has done business, or all the acquaintances he 
has made since his disbarment, the majority would say that 
none of them had known him before-or that because he had 
done well in one type of business and gained a reputation for 
good character and fair and honest business dealings there, he 
might not have that same reputation in another type of busi-
ness. It appears to me that no matter what he does, or says, 
or how many witnesses he produces, The State Bar, aided 
·md abetted by a majority of this Court, will deny him re-
admission to his chosen profession. If past conduct is to be con-
sidered in determining his present fitness to practice law, 
then that is the only result which can be reached because, to 
my mind, ''overwhelming,' proof would be proof with no 
contradictions. If conduct prior to disbarment is not the de-
terminative factor here, then the statements in the majority 
opinion to the effect that no evidence was produced contrary 
to the evidence of his good reputation show that petitioner has 
borne the burden of proof and should be reinstated. 
I would grant the application for reinstatement. 
